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Abstract 
This paper uses data from a large survey of firms across 26 transition countries to 
examine the determinants of trust in the transition process.  We first introduce a new 
measure of trust between firms: the level of prepayment demanded by suppliers from 
their customers in advance of delivery.  Using this new measure, we confirm earlier 
findings that trust is higher where firms have confidence in third party enforcement 
through the legal system.  However, the fairness and honesty of the courts are a more 
important determinant of interfirm trust than are the courts’ efficiency or ability to 
enforce decisions.  We then examine the role of business networks in building trust 
and find that networks based around personal ties – family and friends – and business 
associations actively promote the development of trust, while business networks 
based on enterprise insiders and government agencies do not.  Finally, we find that 
country-level effects are significantly more important determinants of interfirm trust 
than are firm-level effects.   
 
Keywords: Trust, Prepayment, Courts, Business Networks 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Much of the literature on institutions and social capital posits that trust is an important 
prerequisite to well-functioning markets (Arrow 1972, North 1981, Putnam 1993, 
Fukuyama 1995, Stiglitz 1999).  Trust lowers transaction costs and facilitates  
co-operation among entities that might otherwise view mutually advantageous 
exchange as too costly or risky.  Especially in places where third party enforcement – 
i.e., the state and its constituent legal and regulatory institutions – is weak or 
uncertain, a basic belief in a counterpart’s honesty is an “important lubricant” in a 
social and economic system (Arrow 1974).  In these circumstances, trust can be built 
through repeated interactions and the creation of a reputation for cooperating, even 
where incentives for reneging on agreements may be strong (Axelrod 1984). 
 
Trust is a commodity in relatively short supply in transition countries, 
especially in the early stages of transition when institutions are weak and the formal 
and informal bonds holding the economy together are ruptured.  Transition, after all, 
entails massive transactional upheaval, as markets replace central planning as the 
main mechanism for matching producers with consumers.  In relations among 
businesses, widespread re-matching creates significant social costs, until new 
relationships have been formed and some degree of durability and predictability has 
returned (see Blanchard and Kremer 1997).  Although costly and complex, the 
process of breaking up existing ties between firms and allowing for the entry of 
competitors is necessary and beneficial in the longer term.  But until that point is 
reached, the experience of transition can be devastating for firms and consumers, a 
condition that breeds caution and mistrust.  Indeed, as Joseph Schumpeter (1934) has 
written, “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism,” and 
transition is perhaps the most extreme case of “creative destruction” we know of in 
recent economic history (see also EBRD 1997).  The hope at the beginning was, and 
remains, that once the cards have been reshuffled, surviving firms and their customers 
will end up with a better hand. 
 
This process is still unfolding.  This paper looks at how enterprises cope with 
an uncertain contractual environment, where trust is lacking.  Businesses in this 
environment, especially where enforcement of legal contracts is uncertain, face a   3
Prisoner’s Dilemma – they would be best off co-operating with each other in 
executing a contract, but they each face a powerful incentive to renege on their 
obligations in the absence of third party enforcement mechanisms to punish defectors.  
The literature on repeated games, however, holds that co-operation can be built over 
time between actors caught in a Prisoner’s Dilemma through strategies of reciprocity 
– that is, in a strategic interaction, co-operative moves are met with reciprocal co-
operation and defections met with defection.  This has been found to be a robust 
strategy for building co-operation in the absence of a formal sanctioning mechanism 
in a variety of settings (Axelrod 1984).  The analogy in business transactions is 
relational contracting – firms building stable business relationships with known 
partners and resolving disputes through informal rather than formal mechanisms.   
Even in developed markets, where court systems and other market-supporting 
institutions are more advanced, firms are more likely to rely on relationships with 
well-known business partners than more formal mechanisms to resolve disputes 
(Macauley 1963). 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that previous research has found a strong 
correlation between relational contracting and trust at the enterprise level (Johnson et 
al. 1999; McMillan and Woodruff 1999).   While efficient for the firm, relational 
contracting has social costs, because new entrants are deterred and potentially 
profitable matches are not made.  Firms also have been able to rely on reputational 
enforcement mechanisms, by collecting information on new trading partners from 
other participants in existing business networks and sharing their own information on 
the business conduct of their trading partners with others.  In an economy with high 
barriers to entry for new firms and dominance by a relatively small number of key 
players in any specific sector, where effective networks exist to circulate information 
on business conduct, firms will be disciplined to behave in accordance with relevant 
commercial norms lest they receive a reputation for unreliability.  Recent research has 
found that third party enforcement through networks may be a useful complement to 
enforcement through the court system (Woodruff 2002). 
 
In this paper we employ data from a 2002 survey of firms in transition 
countries conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
together with the World Bank, which asked firms specific questions about the   4
contracting environment and the quality of the courts.  The Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a rich data source for an analysis of the 
contracting environment for enterprises in transition, both at the firm and at the 
country level.  In the literature cited above, much of the impact of third party 
enforcement on firm behaviour stems from perceptions of the credibility of such 
enforcement at the firm level within one or a small number of countries.  However, 
without more variation at the country or regional level it is hard to distinguish 
managers’ optimism or gullibility from real differences in the quality of the courts.  
The BEEPS offers the opportunity to test for both firm and country level effects of 
perceptions of the quality of the courts as well as the importance of certain types of 
networks on enterprise trust.  We find that country level variation in these factors 
contributes more to the variation in trust in our sample than variation at the firm level.   
 
The measure of trust used in this literature to date is the share of goods sold by 
a supplier on credit.  The rationale for using trade credit as a measure of trust is that a 
supplier may have an established relationship with a customer that underlies the 
confidence that it will be paid for delivery at an agreed later stage, or it may have 
information on this customer from other sources justifying this confidence, or it may 
trust in the ability of a third party like the courts to enforce payment.  However, this 
metric might be problematic: in the absence of effective bankruptcy mechanisms 
payment default can appear as trade credit.  Therefore, in this paper we introduce an 
alternative measure of trust, or rather distrust, namely the extent of prepayment 
required by a supplier.  We argue that the less confidence a supplier has in its ability 
to collect payment once goods have been delivered, the more a supplier will ask to be 
paid upfront.  We find that, indeed, trade credit may to some extent be involuntary in 
transition economies and that prepayment is a more robust measure of trust. 
 
Thus, one of the main contributions of this paper to the existing literature on 
trust and contract enforcement is the introduction of an alternative measure of trust 
which is found to be robust at the country level. Using prepayment as a measure of 
trust in business relationships, the survey data in the BEEPS is then used to test which 
factors are most likely to build trust among firms: legal reform, the functioning and 
quality of the courts, generalised trust, or the expansion of business networks.  We 
conduct tests at the country level and the firm level, allowing us to distinguish the   5
extent to which supplier firms make prepayment demands on the basis of their 
particular experience in business transactions and the functioning of courts and 
networks versus the average country-wide assessment of the effectiveness of these 
institutions.  Finally, we test for the specific relevance of different aspects of these 
institutions for building trust.  For the courts, we look at whether speed and 
affordability matter more than fairness and honesty.  For business networks, we 
distinguish between social networks (friends and family) and insider networks (former 
and current employees and managers) as sources of information on trusted business 
partners. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we 
briefly describe the data set and how it can be used to test many of the key arguments 
in the literature on contracting in transition economies.  The second section describes 
how prepayment can be an effective proxy for trust in business relationships and why 
it may be a better measure than trade credit.  The third section examines the 
correlation of prepayment at the country level with factors usually associated with 
high levels of trust, such as income per capita and the quality of governance, as well 
as correlations with the level of economic reform, country-level perceptions of the 
quality of the courts and the importance of certain types of business networks.   
Section four turns to firm level evidence on the determinants of prepayment and 
presents our main finding that country-level effects seem to dominate firm level 
perceptions as determinants of trust. The final section concludes with proposed areas 
for further research. 
 
2.  The Survey 
 
The 2002 BEEPS was conducted with nearly 6000 firms in 26 transition economies 
(all of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union except Turkmenistan, where 
implementation was discontinued before the survey was completed).
1  The survey is 
heavily weighted towards small enterprises (67 per cent) and private firms (86 per 
cent).  There are some state-owned firms in the sample (14 per cent), however, and 
some larger enterprises with up to 10,000 employees (14 per cent).  The sample is   6
stratified to match more or less the productive structure in each country, implying a 
heavy representation of service firms (61 per cent). 
 
These features distinguish the sample from that used in Johnson et al. (1999), 
which was based on only private manufacturing firms in five transition economies.  
Unlike Johnson et al., our survey is not a survey of specific transactions.  Our 
measures of prepayment, trade credit, business networks, etc., are all based on 
questions relating to the average experience of each firm rather than to a specific 
transaction.  This is a weakness that makes our results far less precise than the 
transactions specific survey used by Johnson et al.  The advantage of our survey is 
that it covers more countries, with vastly different contracting environments.  One 
benefit of this larger sample is that we can examine and compare the contracting 
environment at the country level.  It is here that variations in the quality of third party 
enforcement through the courts or through reputation networks should be most 
evident.   
 
3.  Prepayment as a measure of trust 
 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson et al. (1999; 2002) construct measures 
of trust and relational contracting at the enterprise level, using the extent to which 
firms are willing to give trade credit to a customer as a measure of trust.  It is assumed 
that an enterprise will only sell goods to another business on credit if it believes it will 
be repaid.  This belief can be based on the knowledge the enterprise has of its 
business partner either through repeatedly trading with her, or through a 
recommendation from a third party.  It can also be based on confidence in the efficacy 
of third party enforcement – that is, the belief that if repayment was delayed, the 
creditor firm can go to a court and have its credit right enforced.   
 
The use of trade credit as a measure of trust at the firm level is not without 
problems, however.  Most importantly, as argued by Kornai (1993), trade credit in a 
transition context may be partially involuntary.  Where bankruptcy enforcement is 
weak or absent, a supplier may have no choice than accept delayed payment for 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The full 2002 BEEPS sample also includes Turkey, which plays no role in our analysis.  For a 
detailed description see Fries, Lysenko and Polanec (2003).  The first round of the BEEPS was   7
delivery, if she does not want to lose her claim altogether.  The propensity to be 
lenient with delinquent customers would be higher still, if the supplier expected to be 
bailed out by the state at a later stage.  Indeed, the level of trade credit has been used 
in the transition literature as an indication of the soft budget constraint (Raiser, 1997).  
The BEEPS contains one question on whether firms had in the past experienced 
payment delays.  Around two thirds of all firms reported experiencing payment 
delays.  The incidence of payment delays is highly correlated with the share of trade 
credit in total sales at the firm level.
2  This evidence does suggest that trade credit 
may in part be involuntary and is not such a good measure of trust in our sample.   
 
We suggest an alternative measure of trust in business transactions: the level 
of prepayment demanded by firms from their customers.  A firm’s willingness to 
forgo prepayment may be seen as an indication that its directors believe they will be 
paid fully and on time, either due to trust in the customer or to trust in the legal 
system and its ability to fairly adjudicate business disputes.  High prepayment 
demands, conversely, can be seen as a measure of distrust in a customer and/or lack of 
confidence in the contract enforcement regime.   
 
Prepayment as a measure of (dis)trust is not without problems either.  It might 
be argued that prepayment actually reflects trust by the customer in the supplier 
delivering the goods after payment has been received.  Conversely, trade credit might 
be a measure of distrust of the customer in the supplier.  Implicit in the use of both 
prepayment and trade credit as measures of trust is the notion that it is suppliers who 
choose the mode of payment for delivery.  This notion appears plausible to us, and the 
empirical evidence presented below supports this interpretation.
3  
 
Another potential problem with prepayment is that it may reflect credit market 
imperfections.  Customers need to prepay suppliers to satisfy their demand for 
working capital.  Without prepayment, no goods might be produced at all.  The same 
                                                                                                                                            
conducted in 1999.  For a description of these results see Transition Report 1999. 
2 The correlation coefficient with the share of trade credit in sales is 0.22 with 5957 observations, 
significant at the 1 per cent level 
3 Jan Fidrmuc has suggested to us to use spot trade, i.e.  the share of sales neither sold on credit nor 
prepaid as a measure of distrust.  We have tried this and found spot trade not to be closely associated 
with any of the variables used in the analysis below.  Results are available upon request.     8
argument holds for trade credit.
4 In the firm level regressions, we control for credit 
market imperfections in examining the importance of other factors determining 
prepayment.  Finally, it could be argued that pre-payment may be more a function of 
the type of good being sold than inter-firm trust – in other words, prepayment may be 
more prevalent in some industry or service sectors than others.  Here again, we 
control for sector specific effects in the firm-level regressions, and we find that the 
variation in prepayment corresponds to the country-level effects, which support the 
conclusion that prepayment is correlated with system-wide trust. 
 
Chart 1 reports country means for prepayment and trade credit among the firms in the 
BEEPS.  The values for each firm were derived from the following two questions: 
 
What per cent of your firm’s sales are pre-paid? 
What per cent of your firm’s sales are sold on credit? 
                                                 
4 We are again grateful to Jan Fidrmuc for pointing this out.     9
Chart 1: Trade credit and prepayment in 26 transition economies 
 
Source: BEEPS 2002 
 
A cursory examination of Chart 1 shows that average prepayment levels are 
higher in less reform oriented and poorer transition economies, such as most countries 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) whereas prepayment is lower in 
the more advanced and richer eastern European countries.  The relationship with 
reform and per capita income is apparently weaker for trade credit, which is high for 
instance in Albania, Belarus and Romania despite these countries’ less advanced stage 
of reform and relatively low level of income.  This is not unexpected given the 
argument made above on the problem of involuntary trade credit.
5 Trade credit is also 
very low in some advanced reform countries such as Croatia, Czech Republic and 
Slovenia.  Henceforth we concentrate on prepayment as our preferred measure of 
(dis)trust.   
 
                                                 
5 More formal correlation analysis bears this out.  For reasons of space, we have dropped trade credit 
from all correlations and regressions presented below.  However, as a rule, correlations with factors 
generally found to be associated with trust both at the country and at the firm level are less strong for 
trade credit than for prepayment.  Results are available upon request. 
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4.  Variations in trust at the country level 
 
We now examine the country-level variation in prepayment more closely.  Table 1 
reports simple cross country correlations of prepayment with income per capita, the 
quality of governance and the level of economic reform.
6  There is a growing body of 
evidence that suggests that wealthier and better governed economies are also higher 
trust societies (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and 
Knack 2001, Rose-Ackerman 2001).  We also present correlations with the average 
score on “generalised trust” taken from the World Values Survey 1995.
7 
 
Table 1 Prepayment as a measure of trust 
 
 
Simple cross-country correlation coefficients 
 
Income per 
capita in US$ 
(PPP), 2002 
Average WB 
score of 
governance, 
2002 
Average EBRD 
transition 
indicator score, 
2002 
World Value 
Survey measure 
of trust,  
1995 
Average 
Prepayment 
as a % of 
sales 
  -0.54 -0.69  -0.70  0.37 
 
Note:  Data for 26 transition economies, excluding Turkmenistan.  Data for World Value Survey is 
available for only 21 countries, excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
The World Bank score for governance is the average of scores for i) voice and accountability, ii) 
political stability and violence, iii) government effectiveness, iv) regulatory burden, v) rule of law, vi) 
graft (corruption).  See www.worldbank.org/governance. 
 
The EBRD index is the average score for the following nine dimensions: 1) price liberalisation, 2) trade 
and forex liberalisation, 3) small scale privatisation, 4) large scale privatisation, 5) enterprise 
restructuring and governance, 6) competition policy, 7) banking reform, 8) non-bank financial 
institutions, 9) infrastructure.  See EBRD (2002) for details. 
 
We use GDP per capita to measure income, the World Bank’s governance 
indicators to measure good governance, and the EBRD transition indicators to 
measure market reform.  The World Bank governance indicators give scores for voice 
and accountability, political stability and violence, government effectiveness, 
                                                 
6 Although the BEEPS has been conducted on representative samples of firms in each country, the 
samples are nonetheless not large enough to exclude the possibility of bias resulting from different 
sample compositions in these cross-country correlations.  We are able to correct for enterprise 
characteristics in the firm-level regressions in the next section.  The results presented here are robust to 
such corrections. 
7 The World Value Survey indicator of trust is the share of the surveyed population in each country, 
who say that most people can be trusted.  See Raiser (2003) for details.   11
regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft.  We take the unweighted average across 
these dimensions as our indicator of governance.  The EBRD transition indicators 
give scores which range from 1 (little reform) to 4+ (high level of reform) for small 
and large scale privatisation, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange controls, 
governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, infrastructure 
(telecommunications, railways, electricity, roads, water), banking reform and interest 
rate liberalisation, and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. For a 
“+”, we add 0.33 and subtract the same for a “-“ from the given score.  Again, we use 
the unweighted average of these dimensions as our indicator of reform. 
 
Overall, the correlations between prepayment and these three measures of trust 
are quite strong: prepayments are significantly lower in countries that are richer, 
better governed, and more advanced in economic reform.
9 The correlations with 
generalised trust have the wrong sign and are only weakly significant, confirming 
other findings casting doubt on the usefulness of the WVS data on generalised trust 
for the transition economies (Raiser, 2003).   
 
Table 2 presents further correlations of prepayment with two sets of variables.  
The first measures the quality of the rule of law and the courts, using both measures 
taken from the BEEPS and measures external to the survey.  In the BEEPS, enterprise 
managers were asked to rate the quality of the courts along several dimensions, which 
we have summarised in three categories: i) fairness and honesty, ii) speed and 
affordability and iii) ability to enforce decisions.
10 We would expect all three 
dimensions to be negatively correlated with prepayment.  In addition to these three 
variables, we also use the EBRD indicators on the extensiveness of reforms of 
commercial law (covering pledge law, insolvency, and civil and commercial codes) 
the World Bank indicator on the rule of law (the sub-component of the governance 
scores used above most likely to affect payment transactions), and a dummy variable 
                                                 
9 The correlations with each of the sub-indicators of the World Bank governance indicator are also 
positive but not presented here for reasons of space.   
10 This was done through simple averaging of replies to separate questions on fairness/impartiality and 
honesty/uncorruptability and speed and affordability.  The reason for averaging was that responses 
were highly correlated across these respective dimensions and hence aggregation reduces the number 
of factors to be interpreted.  All results carry through when the single indicators are used.  Ability to 
enforce is measured with one question only.   12
reflecting the extent to which the existing body of commercial law was “transplanted” 
into a receptive environment or not.  Most transition economies follow German civil 
law or French civil law, but in most CIS countries this legal tradition was imposed 
under Soviet rule (and in Southeastern Europe under the Ottomans) with little 
opportunity to be adapted to local legal traditions (see Pistor et al, 2000).  We expect 
prepayment to be higher in countries less advanced in legal reform and in countries 
that are “unreceptive legal transplants”.   13
Table 2 Determinants of Prepayment: 
Legal system and networks 
 
 
Simple cross-country correlation coefficient 
 
Panel A: Legal System 
 
EBRD 
legal 
reform 
index 
Transplant 
effect 
Courts 
fair/honest
Courts 
quick/ 
affordable
Courts 
able to 
enforce 
WB rule 
of law 
score 
Average 
Prepayment 
as % of 
sales 
-0.55 -0.72 -0.46  0.36  0.11 -0.76 
 
Pane B: Networks 
(Importance of following as sources of information on new customers/suppliers) 
 
Family 
or 
friends 
Former 
employees 
or 
managers 
Existing 
suppliers/ 
customers 
Govt 
agencies 
Business 
assoc. 
Public 
sources/ 
trade 
firms 
Membership in 
business assoc. 
Average 
Prepayment 
as % of  
sales 
-0.32 0.38  -0.32  0.67  -0.19  -0.30  -0.49 
 
Notes: 
EBRD’s legal reform index is the score for the effectiveness of commercial law (including pledge, 
insolvency, civil and commercial codes). 
 
Transplant effect is a dummy scored “1” for all countries, which are “receptive” transplants for the 
reform of commercial law – see Pistor et al. (2000) for details. 
 
The scores for courts are the average scores (from 1-6) per country in a question in the BEEPS asking 
firms to rate the quality of the court system in resolving disputes.  The categories “fair and impartial” 
and “honest and uncorrupted” are closely related and averaged for the purpose of this paper.  The same 
is the case for the categories “guides” and “affordable”. 
 
The WB rule of law indicator comes from the World Bank governance indicators (see Table 1). 
 
The scores on networks are all average country replies to a question in the 
BEEPS asking firms about the importance (1-6) of different sources of information on 
new customers/suppliers.  The categories friends and family and employees and 
managers were aggregated and averaged as the answers to these questions were 
closely correlated.  The last column is the correlation with the average rate of 
membership per in a business association in each country.   14
Table 2 (Panel A) confirms that third party enforcement is associated with 
trust at the country level.  The World Bank rule of law indicator, the EBRD’s rating 
on progress in legal transition, as well as the legal transplant dummy have highly 
negative correlations with prepayment.  Moreover, it appears that enterprises’ 
perceptions of the quality of the courts have a strong association with trust at the 
country level, although different dimensions of the quality of the courts have opposite 
effects.  Average firm perceptions on the fairness and honesty of courts are negatively 
correlated with prepayment – in other words, interfirm trust is higher where courts are 
perceived to be more honest – while perceptions of the court as quick and affordable 
are positive associated with more prepayment.  Perceptions regarding the courts’ 
ability to enforce are not significantly correlated with prepayment.  On this evidence, 
it is the corruptibility of the courts that seems to be a major constraint for the 
development of trust between businesses, rather than the cost of using the courts or 
the courts’ ability to enforce decisions.  We shall test this proposition more rigorously 
in the regressions below.   
 
The second set of variables we examine at the country level is the use of 
different social and business networks to obtain information on new customers and 
suppliers.  Firms may be more or less inclined to trust their business partners 
depending on the source of information about them.  The measure of business 
networks follows Johnson et al. (1999).  Enterprises are asked to rank the following 
sources of information from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important): family; 
friends; former employees who now work for a potential supplier/customer; senior 
manager in firm previously employed by potential supplier/customer; existing 
suppliers/customers; government agencies; business associations and chambers of 
commerce; and trade fairs and other public sources of information.  Because replies 
were highly correlated across the first and second, and third and fourth categories, we 
have averaged them into friends and family (or social networks), workers and 
managers (or insider networks).  In addition, the BEEPS asked firms whether they are 
themselves members of a business association.   
 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that trust at the country level is positively associated 
with reliance on social networks, and networks of existing business contacts for 
information on new customers and suppliers, but negatively associated with reliance   15
on insider networks or government agencies.  Prepayment is significantly lower in 
countries with a high incidence of membership in business associations.  These 
findings suggest that it may be important to distinguish between different types of 
networks, when examining their effects on trust and contracting arrangements 
between firms.  In particular, networks based on the personal contacts of enterprise 
insiders or on contacts with government seem of little help in building trust, whereas 
business and social networks would appear to be more effective.    
 
5.  Determinants of trust: firm level vs. country level effects 
 
We now turn from the country-level correlations to an analysis at the firm level.   
Using the country-level variations together with firm responses on variables such as 
the quality of the courts or the reliance on different networks, we are able to 
distinguish country from firm level effects.  In other words, we can test whether a 
firm’s confidence in the courts over and above the average level of confidence in the 
legal system in a particular country explains the demand for prepayment.  Similarly, 
we can test whether firms are more likely to trust business partners if the average 
reliance on social and business networks in a country is high, or whether trust at the 
firm level is more closely associated with the firm’s own reliance on such networks.   
 
In addition, the firm level analysis allows us to control for a number of other 
important factors.  We control for the role of relational contracting by including a 
dummy variable measuring whether the firm has changed its main customer over the 
past three years.  The less churning in the customer base, the more likely trust will 
develop.  We also control for the share of the three largest customers in total sales.  
Firms whose sales are more concentrated may be less inclined to ask for prepayment, 
for fear of losing an important customer.  We also include controls for the types of 
customers a firm sells to (parent or subsidiary, multinational corporation (MNC), state 
owned, large domestic private – with small domestic private the control group).  We 
further characterise the contracting environment at the firm level by including dummy 
variables measuring whether a firm has experienced payment delays in the past, and 
whether it has used protection or security payments to a private organisation to protect 
its property rights.  Experience of payment delays and use of alternative third party 
enforcement may signal low levels trust and we would expect a positive association   16
with prepayment.  We also include the extent to which a firm relies on internal 
sources for working capital finance as a measure of capital market constraints.  Other 
controls include the firm’s ownership, sector of operation, and size. 
 
Our estimated model takes the form of: 
 
Yijk = aijk + bi ∑(Xi) + bj ∑ (Xj) + ck ∑ (Xk) + eijk, 
 
where Y is the share of prepayment in total sales, i, j, k are firm, country and sector 
subscripts and Xi, Xj, Xk stand for exogenous variables that vary across firms, 
countries or sectors respectively.  The model abstracts from any interaction effects 
between firm-level and country or sector-level variables.  The error term, eijk, is 
assumed to be well behaved with standard properties.   
 
Table 3 reports the results of a multivariate regression of prepayment against 
all the firm, country and sector variables.  It is organised in three panels.  The first 
panel reports results for variables measuring the quality of third party enforcement 
(legal system).  The second panel reports results for the importance of different 
networks.  The third panel reports the coefficients on the most important controls.  
Sectoral, size and ownership controls are not reported.  Firm-level results are reported 
in bold against a white background, while country-level results are reported in italics 
against a grey background.   17
Table 3 Regression results 
 
Dependent variable: prepayment as a % of sales 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Legal system 
Court fair and  
    honest 
-0.38 
-0.75 
0.25 
0.36 
-0.67 
-0.93 
-0.08 
-0.22 
- - 
Court fair and 
    honest 
-18.4*** 
-6.67 
-20.15*** 
-4.63 
-18.34*** 
-4.97 
-23.52*** 
-12.16 
-  - 
Court quick & 
    affordable 
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.57 
-0.75 
0.26 
0.33 
-0.06 
-0.14 
- - 
Court quick & 
    affordable 
12.45*** 
2.98 
14.09** 
2.17 
13.27** 
2.35 
18.71*** 
8.89 
-  - 
Court can  
    enforce 
0.69 
1.64 
2.10*** 
3.49 
-0.16 
-0.27 
0.32 
0.94 
- - 
Court can 
    enforce 
9.31*** 
3.50 
3.47 
0.90 
9.65** 
2.46 
10.50*** 
6.99 
-  - 
Transplant 
    Effect 
-7.79*** 
-3.13 
-11.32*** 
-3.22 
-5.19 
-1.36 
-8.30*** 
-6.10 
-  - 
EBRD legal  
    extensiveness 
-7.62*** 
-4.54 
-4.75 
-1.60 
-8.27*** 
-3.98 
-8.58*** 
-6.40 
-  - 
Networks 
Friends & 
    family 
-1.02** 
-1.99 
-0.46 
-0.61 
-1.25* 
-1.84 
- -1.03** 
-2.59 
- 
Friends &  
    family 
-25.09*** 
-8.25 
-28.73*** 
-6.34 
-22.03*** 
-5.17 
-  -16.83*** 
-9.34 
- 
Employees/ 
    managers 
0.29 
0.54 
1.23 
1.61 
-0.39 
0.53 
- 0.49 
1.14 
- 
Employees/ 
    Managers 
0.09 
0.02 
6.95 
0.91 
-1.09 
-0.16 
-  26.11*** 
7.37 
- 
Customers/ 
    suppliers 
0.20 
0.45 
-0.15 
0.24 
0.50 
0.83 
- 0.17 
0.49 
- 
Customers/ 
    suppliers 
-15.02*** 
-3.12 
-8.19 
-1.03 
-18.68*** 
-2.95 
-  -19.62*** 
-6.50 
- 
Government  
    agencies 
-0.24 
-0.48 
-0.07 
-0.10 
-0.58 
-0.82 
- -0.75* 
-1.85 
- 
Government 
    agencies 
18.83*** 
4.36 
11.02* 
1.80 
24.14*** 
3.87 
-  34.78*** 
12.33 
- 
Business  
    associations 
-0.19 
-0.39 
-0.15 
-0.21 
0.03 
0.04 
- 0.23 
0.58 
- 
Business  
    associations 
2.34 
0.39 
22.31*** 
2.92 
-10.96 
-1.18 
-  18.07*** 
-5.24 
- 
 
Trade fairs/ 
    others 
0.28 
0.66 
-0.41 
-0.67 
0.71 
1.21 
- -0.003 
-0.01 
- 
Trade fairs/ 
    others 
18.42*** 
4.32 
1.31 
0.21 
28.74*** 
4.75 
-  5.35** 
2.29 
- 
Membership in  
   Business ass. 
-18.01*** 
-3.09 
2.31 
0.24 
-29.85*** 
-4.02 
-  -13.88*** 
-4.70 
-   18
 
Controls 
Experienced 
  payment delay 
-1.47 
-1.21 
0.61 
0.25 
-1.91 
-1.31 
- -  -3.04*** 
-2.81 
Security 
    payments 
0.04 
0.04 
0.87 
0.55 
-0.37 
-0.26 
- -  2.36** 
2.42 
Protection 
    payments 
-0.73 
-0.58 
-0.41 
-0.23 
-1.24 
-0.70 
- -  -2.44** 
-2.13 
Share of sales  
    to 3 largest 
    customers 
-0.98 
-0.92 
0.72 
0.45 
-1.56 
-1.11 
- -  -4.65*** 
-4.65 
Change of  
    major cust.,  
    last 3 years 
2.15* 
1.89 
2.12 
1.36 
2.16 
1.32 
- -  4.31*** 
3.93 
Sales to  
    government 
-0.05** 
-2.19 
-0.05 
-1.46 
-0.05 
-1.49 
- -  0.10*** 
5.05 
Sales to MNC’s 
 
-0.03 
-1.10 
-0.002 
-0.06 
-0.08* 
-1.71 
- -  -0.02 
-0.69 
Sales to parent/ 
    Subsidiary 
-0.001 
-0.06 
0.01 
0.30 
-0.001 
-0.05 
- -  -0.05** 
-2.35 
Sales to large 
   domestic com. 
0.03 
1.52 
0.02 
0.71 
0.04 
1.51) 
- -  0.01 
0.62 
Working cap. 
   internal funds 
0.02 
1.22 
-0.004 
-0.18 
0.04 
1.61 
- -  0.02 
1.55 
Working cap. 
   internal funds 
0.66*** 
4.28 
0.18 
0.92 
1.08*** 
4.38 
-  -  1.05*** 
11.83 
R-squared 
 
0.28  0.28 0.30 0.20  0.20  0.07 
No. obs. 
 
3297  1356 1941 4825  5226  4722 
Sector, 
ownership, size 
dummies  
Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics underneath in normal font.  *=10%,  **=5%,  ***=1% 
significance levels. 
All estimations reported using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
Variable names in italics on a grey background refer to country average values.  For details on the 
construction of independent variables, see text. 
See Annex 1 for a detailed description of the dependent and independent variables. 
 
Column 1 carries our preferred specification.  In panel one, we include the 
EBRD’s legal transition indicator and the transplant dummy as external survey 
measures of the quality of the legal system.  These two variables are highly correlated 
with other external variables, such as the average EBRD transition indicators, and the 
World Bank average governance indicators, or the specific World Bank rule of law 
indicator.  Results are unaffected by the choice of other external measures of the   19
quality of the legal system.  We add country-level averages of firm perceptions of the 
fairness/honesty, speed/affordability, and enforcement capacity of courts, as well as 
the firm-level perceptions themselves.  In the second panel, we include country-level 
and firm-level scores for the different network variables.  In the third panel, we 
include the following controls: experience of payment delays, use of security and 
protection payments, share of sales to the three largest customers, changes in the 
firm’s main customer, share of sales to different types of customers, and use of 
internal funds for working capital finance.  The latter variable is included both as a 
firm-level and country-level effect.  Even when a firm is not currently credit 
constrained, the fact that most other firms in a country are may induce demands for 
prepayment, as it might reflect uncertainty over whether credit markets might be 
successfully tapped in future.   
 
The main result of the paper comes through very clearly from the results in 
column 1.  Country-level effects generally dominate firm level effects in explaining 
variation in the level of prepayment.  Starting with panel 1, the EBRD’s legal reform 
indicator and the transplant dummy are both negative and highly significant, as 
expected.  A one notch increase in the legal reform index (out of 4), for instance, 
reduces the share of prepayments in sales by around 7-8 per cent according to these 
estimates. The effect of being a “receptive” legal transplant is of the same magnitude. 
The country-level measures of fairness/honesty and speed/affordability of the courts 
are also highly significant, and retain their opposing signs already found in the 
country-level correlations.  The size of the country effects are very large – for 
example, a one notch increase in the perceived average fairness of the courts reduces 
average prepayment in a country by 20 percentage points of sales. The difference 
between the highest and lowest country average in our sample is around 0.7, 
accounting for a 15 point difference in the prepayment ratio. Higher scores on the 
enforcement capacity of courts at the country level are now also significantly 
positively associated with prepayment, in contradiction to what one might have 
expected.  The firm-level scores on any of the three dimensions do not enter 
significantly into the regressions.  It seems therefore that firms’ propensity to demand 
prepayment is more a function of the general country-wide perception of how well the 
courts function rather than of individual firm perceptions.  Another way of 
interpreting our results is to say that within-country variation of firm perceptions of   20
the quality of the courts is noisy and may reflect other factors, such as managers’ 
optimism, that may not be related to prepayment demands. 
 
Another important result to retain from this regression is the fact that the 
fairness and honesty of the courts comes out consistently as the dimension of the 
courts’ quality that is systematically associated with higher trust at the firm level.  The 
efficiency of the legal system has the opposite effect to what one would have 
expected.  It is possible that this result is driven by the fact that firms in less advanced 
transition economies tend to use the courts less than firms in advanced transition 
economies.
11 Firms that use the courts are more likely to experience frustration with 
the time it takes to go the full legal route (indeed this is true for developed market 
economies as well).  Nonetheless, they are willing to use the courts as a last resort and 
thus demand less prepayment.  In columns 2 and 3, we re-estimate the same model 
splitting the sample into firms that have used the courts (column 2) and those that 
have not (column 3).  However, the positive impact of the efficiency 
(speed/affordability and enforcement) of courts on prepayment demands remains.   
This does not suggest that reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the court 
system are not important in their own right, but rather that what discourages firms 
from using the courts and adjusting their behaviour accordingly is the fairness and 
uncorruptability of courts. 
 
The results in panel 2 of column 1 also confirm the prominence of country 
level over firm level effects.  Reliance on networks based around family and friends 
reduces prepayment (increases trust) both at the firm and at the country level.  The 
same is true at the country level for business networks (information from existing 
clients and suppliers).  The impact of insider networks (workers and managers) is not 
significant among firms that have used the courts, while reliance on government 
networks retains its strong positive association with prepayment at the country level, 
already found in Table 2.  At the country level, reliance on public sources of 
information such as trade fairs also seems to be associated with higher prepayment.  
All these effects are quantitatively large. For instance, the difference between the 
                                                 
11 A simple probit analysis of use of the courts as a plaintiff against the average EBRD transition 
indicator returns a highly significant positive coefficient on reform (coefficient of 0.17, with a z-stat of 
10.37, significant at 1 per cent level).   21
highest (Yugoslavia at 2.5) and the lowest (Azerbaijan at 1.6) average reliance on 
family and friends networks would account for a full 22 point difference in 
prepayment. Uzbekistan’s average score for reliance on government networks is 2.7, 
that of Slovenia is 1.6 – accounting for a roughly 20 point difference in the share of 
prepayments in sales.  
 
Our results provide an interesting qualification to the results of Johnson et al. 
(1999).  These authors found that an enterprise’s willingness to extend trade credit to 
a customer increased if the firm had received information on this customer from any 
of the different sources listed above, with no major difference across categories of 
networks.  The results of our regressions suggest that the type of network matters.  
However, we do not have data on specific business relationships between a firm and 
one particular customer.  All we can say is that firms which tend to rely more on 
social and business networks as sources of information are more likely to trust their 
customers than firms which tend to rely more on government and insider based 
networks. 
Finally, our estimations provide somewhat contradictory results with respect 
to the role of business associations.  Reliance on business associations as a main 
source of information on potential new customers/suppliers is not generally associated 
strongly with prepayment at either the firm or the country level (except for the 
subsample of court users, where the association is positive – see Model 2).  However, 
membership in a business association tends to increase prepayments at the firm level 
and decrease prepayment at the country level.  The firm-level result is in contradiction 
with Frye (2003), who found a strong positive association among Russian firms 
between membership in business associations, a propensity to provide trade credit, 
and investment in fixed capital.  The country-level effect is much larger, however, and 
suggests that when a sufficiently large proportion of firms are members in business 
associations, this has positive externalities on all other firms and reduces the average 
level of prepayment in this country.   
 
The coefficients on the control variables reported in the third panel largely 
conform with prior expectations.  Prepayment is higher in firms that have had a 
change in major customer over the past three years, and lower in firms that have 
highly concentrated sales.  Both variables are only marginally significant however.  In   22
contrast to Johnson et al. (1999) and Woodruff (2002) our sample is not too well 
suited for investigating the importance of relational contracting or controlling for 
technological effects on contracts, such as asset specificity.  The experience of 
payment delays and the use of security and protection payments show no significant 
association with prepayment, nor does the type of customer a firm mainly sells to 
matter much.  Finally, as expected credit market constraints, measured as a function 
of use of internal funds for working capital finance, are associated with higher 
prepayment demands, and again it is the country–level effect that seems to dominate. 
The difference between an economy with no credit constraints and one with no credit 
market would account for around 66 points difference in prepayment. 
 
A look at the R-square of the regressions shows that overall we are able to 
explain a bit more than one quarter of the variation in prepayment.  This may seem 
disappointing, given the battery of controls, but for a large firm-level cross-section 
analysis low R-square values are not unusual.  The number of observations reveals 
that we capture less than 60 per cent of the total sample.  We therefore caution the 
reader that sample selection bias may be a problem in our regressions.  As one test for 
robustness, we include the three blocks of variables in panels 1, 2 and 3 one at a time, 
always including all sector, size and ownership controls.  For panel one, this increases 
the numbers of observations to 4825.  As shown in Model 4 the results for the legal 
variables are unaffected.  For panel two, the sample increases to 5226 observations 
(Model 5).  We now find a significant positive association between reliance on insider 
networks and the level of prepayment at the country level.  All other results hold.  The 
variables in panel 3 generally achieve higher significance when included on their own 
and the sample increases to 4722 observations (column 7).  The main results on the 
importance of relational contracting and on the role of credit market constraints come 
through unaffected.  Note that sales to government are now positively associated with 
higher prepayment, confirming the finding that business relations based around or on 
government agencies tend to be characterised by lower trust.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Using data from a large survey of firms across 26 transition economies, this paper has 
looked at the extent of trust in business relationships by measuring the level of   23
prepayment demanded by suppliers in very different contracting environments.   
Prepayment is a robust measure of trust that is closely correlated at the country level 
with characteristics such as higher income per capita, good governance and reform, 
which we tend to associate with higher levels of trust. 
 
We have investigated a range of potential determinants of trust.  We have 
found that, in line with the results of earlier studies, trust among businesses is higher 
where confidence in third party enforcement through the legal system is higher.   
However, we also found that the fairness and honesty of the courts was a more 
important determinant of trust than their efficiency or ability to enforce decisions.  In 
addition, we investigated the role of different types of business networks and found 
that these have a varying impact on the degree of trust between enterprises.  It appears 
that networks based around family and friends as well as membership in business 
associations may help to build trust, whereas the opposite result was obtained for 
networks based around enterprise insiders and government agencies.   
 
Our results suggest that, far from destroying social capital, reforms may help 
to build it.  The state can lead by example if its officials act in honest ways.  Just why 
the courts’ fairness and honesty is a more important determinant of trust than the 
courts’ speed and affordability or their ability to enforce decisions remains somewhat 
unclear.  As Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2002) point out, when justice is 
subverted by powerful economic interest groups, other businesses tend to turn away 
from the justice system, with negative consequences for the whole economy.   
Hellman and Kaufman (2002) provide a preliminary investigation of the determinants 
of enterprise perceptions of the quality of the courts in the BEEPS, taking into 
account the role of interest groups and capture.  The results in this paper suggest that 
this is a fruitful avenue for further work.   
 
Our analysis also reveals an interesting dichotomy between measures of trust 
obtained from business surveys and more conventional measures of trust, such as 
contained in the World Values Survey.  As shown by Raiser (2003), the transition 
economies stand out among other economies around the world for the lack of 
correlation between measures of income and the level of generalised trust.  There is 
further evidence in this paper that the WVS data on generalised trust may not be a   24
good representation of the existing moral resources in the business sector of transition 
economies.   
 
Finally, the paper shows that enterprises use different types of networks to 
obtain information on business partners.  These networks have strikingly different 
effects on trust, and their importance varies significantly across countries.  We have 
not so far investigated further the precise properties of these different networks, in 
terms of the characteristics of firms that they represent, or the association with other 
aspects of the business environment.  As shown in the collection of papers in Grabher 
and Stark (1998), transition has led to the emergence of different types of business 
networks, some open and competitive, others closed and protective.  Drawing the link 
between these findings and those in our paper on the different impact of different 
types of networks on trust among firms remains a task for future research. 
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Annex 1: Variables Definition 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
  
Prepayment  Percent of firms’ sales that is pre-paid 
(percentage of total sales for which firms are 
paid in advance of delivery) 
Trade credit  Percent of firms’ sales that is sold on credit 
(percentage of total sales which firms deliver 
on promise of payment at later date) 
   
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
  
Legal system variables   
Court fair and honest  How often do firms associate this description 
with the court system in resolving disputes? 
(1=Never, 6=Always) 
Court quick & affordable  How often do firms associate this description 
with the court system in resolving disputes? 
(1=Never, 6=Always) 
Court can enforce [its decisions]  How often do firms associate this description 
with the court system in resolving disputes? 
(1=Never, 6=Always) 
Transplant Effect  Dummy variable reflecting the extent to 
which the existing body of commercial law 
was “transplanted” into a receptive 
environment. 
EBRD legal extensiveness  Survey-based assessment of the extensiveness 
of laws on the books.  For commercial law, 
includes impact of pledge, bankruptcy and 
company law on commercial transactions.  
For financial markets law, assess whether 
banking and capital market legal rules 
approach minimal international standards. 
   
Networks variables   
Friends & family  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
Employees/managers  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
Customers/suppliers  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
   28
Government agencies  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
Business associations  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
Trade fairs/others  How important is this group as a potential 
source of information about new suppliers? 
(1=Not important, 6=Extremely important) 
Membership in Business association  Dummy variable for firm membership in a 
business association or chamber of commerce 
   
Control variables   
Experienced payment delay  Dummy variable for whether firms have ever 
had to resolve an overdue payment 
Security payments  Dummy variable for whether firm makes 
security payments 
Protection payments  Dummy variable for whether firm makes 
protection payments 
Share of sales to 3 largest customers  Percentage of sales in last 12 months to 3 
largest customers 
Change of major cust., last 3 years  Dummy variable for whether firm has 
changed its major customer in last 3 years 
Sales to government  Percentage of domestic sales to government 
Sales to MNC’s  Percentage of domestic sales to multinational 
companies located in host country 
Sales to parent/Subsidiary  Percentage of domestic sales to parent 
company or affiliated subsidiaries 
Sales to large domestic com.  Percentage of domestic sales to large (250+ 
employees) domestic firms 
Working cap. internal funds  Percentage of firm’s working capital and new 
fixed investment financed from internal funds 
or retained earnings; a proxy for capital 
market constraints 
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